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Practical wisdom in medicine and health care
How do professionals in medicine and health care
know what to do? How should they make the right
or a wise decision in morally complex and uncer-
tain situations? And what is the role of the patient
in this decision making process? The ﬁrst ﬁve
articles in this issue focus on these and similar
questions, be it in very different ways.
Ricca Edmondson returns to the classic Aristo-
telian notion of practical wisdom. References to
this notion are rather an invitation to further
reﬂection on morally right behaviour than a
concrete guideline to follow. Aristotle describes
prudence or practical wisdom (phronesis) as
‘‘knowing the right thing to do in a particular
circumstance through understanding the circum-
stance rightly, knowing what matters, and eﬀective
means-end reasoning to bring about what mat-
ters.’’ Thinking in terms of wisdom refers to forms
of reasoning and deliberation in which knowledge,
reﬂection, attitude and life experience are com-
bined with emotional, social, and ethical capacities.
The author argues for a threefold wisdom-based
approach. Central to Ricca Edmonsons approach
is her focus on the capacities of the self (that is, the
professional doing the reasoning), the capacities of
the other (patient, colleagues), and the demands of
the problem itself. Dan Egonsson also deals with
the classic notion of wisdom. He oﬀers an analysis
of so-called hypothetical approval, either in the
form of preferences or consent. He takes the
problem areas prudence, euthanasia and coercive
psychiatric care as examples to illustrate his
argument. By prudence he refers to the sphere of
personal value or self-interest. An object has
prudential value for someone when it makes
someones life better, independently of whether it
makes any diﬀerence for others and independently
of its moral value. The problem, however, is that
there are several understandings of the concept of
approval. Dan Egonsson discusses three main
alternatives, approval as an actual preference, as
a rational preference and as consent.
Regarding the problem of how to arrive at a
wise decision in a morally complex situation, it is
common standard in bioethics to use a framework
with four phases. If patients are competent, they
should be adequately informed and decide for
themselves. If they are incompetent, an advance
directive might be helpful. If there is no advance
directive, caregivers may try to come to a substi-
tuted judgement or act according to the best
interest principle. Sigurdur Kristinssons paper is
about the ﬁrst phase, that is, the informed consent
standard, especially in the area of research ethics.
He critically reviews the Belmont Report from
1979 and argues that if this report is to be based on
a conception of autonomy that generates moral
justiﬁcation, it will either have to be interpreted in
a Kantian way or coupled with something like
Mills conception of individuality. He comes to the
conclusion that the justiﬁcation should be along
the lines of Kantian autonomy and not Mills
individual autonomy. Linus Brostro¨m and co-
authors focus on the third phase, the substituted
judgement standard. They argue that the current
formulation of the substituted judgement standard
is incomplete and offers those who must make a
surrogate decision little or no guidance. In their
view, the principle of substituted judgement cannot
be seen as well deﬁned as long as it remains unclear
under what conditions the patient is supposed to
make his or her decision. Their paper discusses this
problem of underdetermined decision conditions.
Kristin Zeiler, ﬁnally, also deals with decision
making and focuses on the notion of shared
decision making. She distinguishes between a
shared decision making process and a shared
autonomous decision making process. In her anal-
ysis she focuses on the area of new reproductive
medicine (IVF, PGD) and clinical genetics. Possi-
ble gender diﬀerences in shared decision making
are also discussed.
The following two papers might be put under the
umbrella of the notion of harm and the principle of
non-maleﬁcence.Michael JohnMcNamee examines
the concept of Schadenfreude. This German term is
diﬃcult to translate. Taken literally it means some-
thing like harm joy. It refers to the experience of
feeling pleasure in anothers misfortune and being
harmed. Based on Aristotles and Kants thoughts
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about rationality and emotions McNamee argues
that feeling Schadenfreude, especially in the course
of health care work, is evidence of an objectionable
emotion and a deﬁcient character. Linda Scheirton
and co-authors deal with harmful practice errors in
occupational and physical therapy. Using predom-
inant bioethical theories, ethical principles and
professional codes of ethics they analyse six harmful
cases reported by occupational and physical thera-
pists in focus group interviews. It is known from the
literature that a signiﬁcant number of ethical issues
evoked by these errors continue to trouble the
reporting therapists. The authors conclude that the
only way towards a culture of safety is an attitude of
openness, a principle willingness to reveal ones
errors, and moral courage. Several patient safety
strategies are suggested that might have prevented
the events described in these six cases.
The next two papers are about death and dying,
and a persons rights after his or her death. Carlo
Leget retrieves the medieval ars moriendi tradition.
North Atlantic culture, he argues, lacks a com-
monly shared view on the good death that helps
dying people, their family members and caregivers
to cope with the dying process. He presents an
updated version of the ars moriendi tradition that
meets the demands of present day secularized and
pluralistic society. In his model inner space is a
central phenomenon. Five themes that are central
to this new art of dying are: autonomy and the self,
pain control and medical intervention, attach-
ments and relations, life balance and guilt, death
and afterlife. Part of the medieval ars moriendi
tradition is the idea of an encounter between the
living and the dead symbolized in the so-called
dances of death. Malin Masterton and co-authors
explore a modern version of this encounter. They
analyse our moral intuition that the dead can have
some kind of moral claim on the living and that we
have moral duties towards the dead. They argue
that there are indeed posthumous interests and
that one such interest, the interest in ones good
name, has moral signiﬁcance. This view has
practical consequences when it comes to the use
of body material after death and the reputation of
historic persons.
The ﬁnal paper in this issue addresses the role
and function of complementary and alternative
medicine (CAM). Marcel Mertz analyses possible
and plausible ethical justiﬁcations for the general
use of CAM. His paper provides a systematic
analysis of principles, concepts and values that can
be relevant to the debate about CAM without
aiming at ﬁnal answers to all questions posed. His
ﬁndings show that beneﬁcence and non-maleﬁ-
cence are central issues for an ethical justiﬁcation
of CAM as a practice, while freedom of thought
and religion are central notions regarding CAM as
a belief system.
Wim Dekkers and Bert Gordijn,
Editors-in-chief
EDITORIAL232
